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in Sweden 
Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
Sweden has experienced slow economic growth during the past quarter century 
compared to its historical record and compared to the average performance of 
other OECD countries. From 1970 to 1992, Swedish output per capita grew at 
only 60 percent of the OECD average, and Sweden’s relative PPP-adjusted in- 
come per capita fell from third to seventeenth among OECD countries. This 
dismal post-1970 growth performance stands out in especially sharp relief 
when  set against Sweden’s remarkable record of economic growth during the 
previous one hundred years. From 1870 to 1970, Swedish output per manhour 
rose seventeen fold, the highest growth rate among sixteen OECD countries 
for which comparable data are available (Maddison 1982).’ 
While output growth has been slow in recent decades, a casual inspection 
of  the data suggests that-until  recently-Sweden’s  relative employment per- 
formance looked attractive: unemployment rates were very low,  labor force 
participation rates rose secularly, and private sector employment grew strongly 
in the late 1980s. But the  1991-93  economic crisis triggered unprecedented 
job losses, and employment contracted by  approximately 15 percent in three 
years. In  fact, a closer scrutiny of  the data points to long-term problems in 
Swedish employment performance. We  return to this matter below. Here, we 
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1. Henrekson, Jonung, and Stymne (1996) provide a detailed discussion of Sweden’s record of 
economic growth. 
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simply highlight one of our most important observations: from 1950 to 1992, 
all net job creation in Sweden took place in the public sector. 
Slow output and productivity growth during the past quarter century, forty- 
odd years of  stagnation in  private sector employment, and a profound eco- 
nomic contraction during the early  1990s-these  are some unpleasant facts, 
and they cry out for an explanation of what went wrong. We consider one set 
of factors that may constitute an important part of the answer. In particular, we 
consider whether tax policy and other important features of Swedish economic 
policies  and institutions hampered economic growth and efficiency by  dis- 
torting the industrial, employer size, and employer age structure of  employ- 
ment and output.* Distorting policies and institutions are ones that encourage 
the misallocation or inefficient use of  capital and labor. Such distortions in- 
clude an inefficient allocation of physical capital between industries, ineffi- 
cient organizational forms for carrying out economic activities, and an ineffi- 
cient allocation of work time within the market sector or between the market 
and home sectors. 
It will be helpful to set out the main elements of our thesis briefly: 
1.  Several aspects of Swedish tax policy disfavor smaller, younger, and less 
capital intensive firms. Tax policy also discourages entrepreneurship and fam- 
ily ownership in favor of institutional forms of ownership. As a consequence, 
tax policy retards entry by new firms, distorts the size structure of employment 
within industries, and distorts the industrial distribution of  employment and 
output. 
2. Other important aspects of the Swedish system-including  credit market 
policy, employment security laws, and a system of centralized wage bargaining 
that compressed wage differentials-also  disfavored smaller, younger, and less 
capital intensive firms and distorted the industrial distribution of employment. 
3.  These policy-induced distortions in business ownership patterns and in 
the distribution of employment and output by industry and by  employer size 
and age hamper the efficient allocation of  resources, reduce productivity, and 
retard economic growth. 
4.  The adverse growth and efficiency effects of these policy-induced distor- 
tions have been exacerbated by exogenous changes in the economic environ- 
ment  related  to  the  widespread  shift  from  goods-producing  to  service- 
producing industries and the downsizing of production units in many goods- 
producing industries. 
The weight and nature of our evidence differ greatly among the elements of 
our thesis, and we note at the outset that the available evidence is incomplete 
on key points. Our aim here is to build a plausible case for our thesis, recogniz- 
ing that the evidence is largely suggestive. For this reason, we regard our re- 
search as an exploratory investigation rather than an exhaustive study of distor- 
2. Myhrman (1994) is an attempt to explain the (relative) rise and decline of  the Swedish econ- 
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tions  in the  structure of  Swedish employment  and  their  adverse economic 
consequences. 
To set the stage for our analysis more fully, we review several noteworthy 
aspects of the postwar Swedish employment record in section 9.1. The subse- 
quent two sections describe how tax policy and other key features of the Swed- 
ish system disfavor younger, smaller, and less capital intensive employers and 
distort the industrial distribution of employment. 
Next, in section 9.4, we offer several reasons why unfavorable policy treat- 
ment of younger, smaller, and less capital intensive employers undermines pro- 
ductivity and growth. Reflecting a paucity of evidence in the literature, we can 
say little about the magnitude of these productivity and growth effects. Instead, 
section 9.5 develops evidence of significant employment distortions by relating 
U.S.-Swedish differences in the industrial distribution of employment to a va- 
riety of  industry characteristics  such as capital intensity, the distribution  of 
workers by establishment and firm size, the structure of wages, and the pace at 
which jobs are reallocated among establishments within an industry. 
The pattern of U.S.-Swedish differences in the industrial distribution of em- 
ployment conforms well to the implications of our thesis, and a plausible read- 
ing of the evidence attributes many of U.S.-Swedish differences in the indus- 
trial  distribution  of  employment  to  distortions  associated  with  the  tax, 
regulatory, and wage-setting policies and institutions described in sections 9.2 
and 9.3. After developing this evidence, we review some international trends 
in the industrial and size distribution of employment. These trends are indica- 
tive of exogenous changes in the economic environment that probably exacer- 
bate the adverse economic consequences of  the employment distortions  in- 
duced by Swedish policies and institutions. We conclude in section 9.7 with a 
few remarks about the policy implications of our findings. 
9.1  Noteworthy Aspects of the Postwar Swedish Employment Record 
Figure 9.1 shows the secular increase in Sweden’s employment rate, which 
rose from slightly above 70 percent of the working-age population in the early 
1950s to a peak of 84 percent in 1990. Remarkably, more than 100 percent of 
this development is accounted for by  increased employment among women. 
From 1970 to 1990, the female employment rate increased by  22 percentage 
points, whereas the male rate declined by  1.5 percentage points3  As of  1992, 
the male employment rate exceeded the female rate by  only 2.2 percentage 
points, in striking contrast to the gap of 27.6 percentage points in 1970. 
The rise in the ratio  of  female-to-male employment is a ubiquitous  phe- 
nomenon among OECD economies in recent decades. In part, this develop- 
ment reflects common and pronounced changes in the structure of  labor de- 
3. According to Silenstam (1960), the female participation rate was 44.8 percent in 1950. By 
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Fig. 9.1 
1950-92 
Source: Statistics Sweden. 
Note: Public employment is defined as average number of employees in local and central govem- 
ment, including social security funds. 
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mand, as evidenced  by  the  widespread  shift  in employment  from goods- 
producing to service-producing sectors and the relatively rapid growth of pub- 
lic sector employment in many countries, two trends that increase the relative 
demand for women   worker^.^ But, as emphasized  in Rosen’s (chap. 2 in this 
volume) analysis, major components of Swedish economic and social policy 
have  accentuated  shifts  in  the  structure  of  labor demand and  contributed 
strongly toward the rise in female employment and participation rates. Indeed, 
Rosen reports that almost all Swedish employment growth between  1963 and 
1992 is accounted for by the growth of female employment in the local pub- 
lic sector. 
Public  sector employment  growth  is in fact a central  feature of  Swedish 
economic policy in recent decades. As figure 9.2 shows, the public sector ac- 
counts for all Sweden’s net employment growth after 1950. Between 1950 and 
1992, public sector employment grew by  1.1 million, whereas private sector 
employment actually shrank by roughly 200,000 jobs.5  Even at the peak of the 
most recent employment boom in 1990, private sector employment exceeded 
the 1950 level by only 40,000 jobs, despite an increase of 820,000 persons in 
the working-age population (sixteen to sixty-four years). Private sector jobs as 
a fraction of the working-age population fell from 67 percent in  1950 to 53 
percent in 1992. Seen in this perspective, the employment performance of the 
private sector in Sweden is weak indeed, and the employment expansion dur- 
ing the long boom in the second half of the 1980s appears far less impressive. 
Another noteworthy trend-also  partly driven by rising public  sector em- 
ployment-is  the secular decline in Sweden’s rate of self-employment.6 Figure 
9.3 shows that self-employment fell from 19 percent of total employment in 
1950 to only 7 percent in 1991. Virtually all this decline occurred between the 
late 1950s and the early 1980s. The continual, albeit slower, decline throughout 
the 1970s is chiefly explained by a drop in agricultural employment. In recent 
years, the self-employment rate has stabilized at a low level relative to Swe- 
den’s  historical experience and relative to the contemporaneous situation in 
other countries.  Indeed, a recent  OECD study reports  that,  since the early 
1970s,  Sweden  has  exhibited  the  lowest  ratio  of  nonagricultural  self- 
employment to civilian employment among all OECD countries (see table 9.1  .)’ 
4. In this respect, we note that women account for 72 percent of Swedish public sector employ- 
ment in 1991, as compared to only 34 percent of private sector employment. 
5. Lindh (1994) argues that the employment figures used here overestimate the employment 
level for the  1950s. Using Lindh’s estimate of the employment level in the 1950s as a point of 
departure, the private sector employment contraction would be roughly  100,000 less. However, 
this does not change any of  the conclusions. Furthermore, it may be  noted that private sector 
employment fell by  an additional 169,000 in 1993. 
6. Sweden’s growth in public sector employment contributed to the decline in self-employment 
both by drawing workers into a sector with no scope for self-employment and by publicly provid- 
ing services such as child care and medical care with potentially high self-employment rates in a 
system of provision by the private sector. 
7. Strangely enough, that OECD study finds an increase in the Swedish self-employment rate 
of 67 percent between 1986 and 1990. However, a corresponding increase cannot be detected in 358  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
Another recent study finds that Sweden has a lower self-employment rate in 
1992 than a dozen member countries of the European Community (EC) for 
which data are available; the Swedish self-employment rate is less than half 
the EC average (see the last column of table 9.1). 
A low self-employment rate is but one aspect of broader differences be- 
tween the structure of employment in Sweden and other countries.  For ex- 
ample, large firms account for a disproportionately high fraction of employ- 
ment in Sweden. Table 9.2 illustrates this point by drawing on a recent Statens 
Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) study that compares the distribution of employ- 
ment by  firm size among several European countries. In 1986, firms with at 
least five hundred employees account for 60.4 percent of total employment in 
Sweden, as compared to only 30.4 percent in the European Community as a 
whole. Even in the much larger economies of Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom, the largest firm size class accounts for less than 40 percent of em- 
ployment. At the other end of the size distribution, firms with fewer than ten 
employees account for only 9.5 percent of employment in Sweden, less than 
half the employment share of very small firms in the European Community.* 
Table 9.3 presents complementary evidence on the relatively small role of 
small firms in Sweden. Among sixteen European countries, Sweden shows the 
largest value for mean enterprise size in 1990. Average enterprise size is thir- 
teen in Sweden, more than twice the corresponding average value for the six- 
teen European count~ies.~ 
The interpretation of these cross-country comparisons of average firm size 
and the employment distribution by firm size is clouded by ambiguities in the 
economic concept of a firm, by differences among countries in the legal defi- 
nition of  a firm, and by  differences in measurement  procedures.  But there 
seems little doubt that Sweden’s reputation as a land of  big business is well 
founded, If  anything, the figures in  tables  9.2 and 9.3 fail to fully convey 
fig. 9.3, which casts serious doubt on this figure. Between 1986 and 1987, there is an increase of 
109,000, or 63 percent, in the number of self-employed in the OECD data for Sweden.  Apparently, 
some mistake has been made in the data-collection process, possibly that the self-employed in the 
agricultural sector are accidentally included after 1986. According to the 1995 annual report put 
out by  the European Observatory for SMEs (Zoetermeer, 1995), Swedish self-employment (in- 
cluding agriculture) amounted to 6.8 percent of the labor force in 1990. 
8. Table 9.2 probably overstates the relative importance of large firms in  Sweden because the 
public sector accounts for such a large fraction of  Swedish employment. With few exceptions, 
public sector employees are categorized as working in  very large firms. However, even if  we re- 
strict attention to the construction, extraction, and manufacturing sectors (for which public em- 
ployment is very  small), the share of  Swedish employment accounted for by  large firms (five 
hundred or more employees) is still unusually high. There is only one exception among the set of 
countries included in table 9.2: For NACE 2-4 (extraction and manufacturing), the United King- 
dom share in the five hundred or more category is 0.9 percentage points higher than in  Sweden. 
This fact may reflect the inclusion of British coal mines, which were still operating in 1986. 
9. Although not directly addressing the question whether most jobs are created in large and old 
firms, it may be noted that Davidsson, Lindmark, and Olofsson (1994) found that, of the 207,903 
jobs that were created net in the period 1985-89 in the private sector, only 16 percent were created 
in firms consisting of only one establishment. Note that 1985-89  is the only reasonably sustained 
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Fig. 9.2  Cumulative change of private employment, government employment, 
and population in Sweden, 1950-92  (thousands) 
Source: Statistics Sweden. 
the extent of  concentrated ownership and control in Sweden. In this regard, 
Folster and Peltzman  (chap. 8 in this volume)  note that,  in  1985, “the five 
biggest final owners held some 44 percent of the total voting rights in compa- 
nies with more than five hundred employees, while the ten biggest had more 
than half.” In addition, they write that “these final owners tend to hold shares 
through intermediaries, such as investment companies, which in turn are linked 
through joint ownership. Fourteen such ‘empires’ dominate the corporate sec- 
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Fig. 9.3  Self-employment as a share of total employment in Sweden, 1950-91 
Source: Statistics Sweden, national accounts. 
Note: Owing to the inclusion of the agricultural sector, the level of self-employment is consistently 
higher than in table 9.3. 
two-thirds of  employment, sales, and total assets of  the 270 largest corpora- 
tions in Sweden.” Coupled with the figures in tables 9.2 and 9.3,  these remarks 
highlight  the  dominant  economic  role  of  large  corporate  organizations  in 
Sweden. 
Finally, while  available data are limited, there is evidence to suggest that 361  Industrial Policy, Employer Size, and Economic Performance 
Table 9.1  Nonagricultural Self-Employment as a Proportion of Civilian 
Employment in OECD Countries, 1973,1979,1986, and 1990, and 
Self-Employment Including Agriculture as a Share of the Labor 
Force in the Twelve EC Countries and Sweden, 1992 (%) 

































































































































Sources; OECD Employmenr Ourlook, July 1992, 158 for 1973, 1979, 1986 and 1990. European 
Observatory for SME?, Third Annual Report 1995 (Zoetermeer, 1995), for 1992. 
Note: N.A. = not available 
AExcluding  owner-managers of incorporated businesses (in the U.K. data this category is partly in- 
cluded). 
1989. 
Sweden experiences low rates of new firm formation. Drawing on the recent 
study by Braunerhjelm and Carlsson (1993), figure 9.4 displays annual entry 
rates from 1920 to 1991 of new manufacturing firms with more than one em- 
ployee. The figure shows that rates of new firm formation in the Swedish manu- 
facturing sector became quite low by the 1950s. The entry rate fell to 1.5 per- 
cent in the 1970s, and the average entry rate was even lower in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.lO 
To summarize, Sweden has undergone an extended period of stagnation in 
10. On the other hand, using data from the late 1980s,  Lundstrom et al. (1993) find that the rate 
of new firm formation in Sweden is at a level comparable to that of several other European coun- 
tries. However, we do not know how sensitive this finding would be to the exclusion of new firms 
with no employees. 362  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
EU-12  6 
Table 9.2  The Distribution of Employment according to Firm Size in Selected 
European Countries, 1986 
Number of  Employees 
Europe-I6  6 
1-9  10-99  100-499  500- 
Sweden  9.5  17.3  12.6  60.6 
European Community  20.9  48.7a  30.4 
Germany  18.2  27.3  18.7  35.8 
France  15.1  28.6  16.7  39.6 
United Kingdom  23.2  23.9  22.9  30.0 
Netherlands  14.0  21.7  17.1  41.3 
Denmark  16.8  42.4  23.2  17.6 
Source: SOU (1992, 308). 
Nore: Firms with no employees and firms in the primary sector are excluded. The public sector 
is included. 
"1 0-499. 
Table 9.3  Average Enterprise Size in Sixteen European Countries in 1990 

























Austria  12 
Finland  12 
Norway  10 
Sweden  13 
EFTA-4  12 
private  sector employment during the past four decades. Since  1950 all net 
job creation occurred in the public sector. The strong secular growth in public 
sector employment during recent decades probably generated much of the im- 
petus behind other important employment trends in recent decades, including 
the absolute and relative rise of  female employment and the decline in the 
Swedish self-employment rate. In comparisons among OECD countries, Swe- 
den stands out as having the highest ratio of public sector to total employment, 
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9.2  Tax Policy and the Structure of Employment 
This section outlines several features of  the pre-1990 Swedish tax system 
that disfavored younger, smaller, and less capital intensive firms and that dis- 
couraged entrepreneurship and family ownership in favor of institutional forms 
of ownership. International comparisons indicate that these tax-induced distor- 
tions were more severe in Sweden than in other countries. 
Several important distortions  stem from high statutory rates of  corporate 
income taxation coupled with other policies that led to much lower effective 
tax rates. Figure 9.5 shows that the statutory corporate income tax rate was 
very high throughout the period until 1990. The level was consistently in the 
50-62  percent interval, until it was almost halved from roughly 55 to 30 per- 
cent in the 1991 tax reform. But these high statutory rates tell only part of the 
story. Until the late  1950s, the difference was slight between  statutory and 
effective  tax  rates,  but,  beginning  in  1958, a  large  gap between  the  two 
emerged, and this gap widened  considerably over time. These observations 
lead us to a discussion of the main sources of the discrepancy between statu- 
tory and effective tax rates and to some remarks about the implications for the 
structure of employment. 
The low effective corporate income tax rates resulted from the introduction 
of  tax-reducing depreciation rules, inventory valuation rules, other more ad 
hoc tax reductions,l'  and the  so-called  investment fund  system. Bergstrom 
(1982) and Sodersten (1984, 1983) describe the rules in detail, but what is 
crucial here is that these low effective tax rates reflect behavioral responses by 
firms to the rules in place. The rules that enabled firms to attain effective tax 
rates well below the statutory rates had powerful effects on the allocation of 
capital and other resources. 
Two of the most important types of rules involve liberal provisions for accel- 
erated depreciation and the Swedish investment fund system. Since the 1950s, 
Swedish firms have been able to switch freely between two options for depreci- 
ating the acquisition cost of machinery and equipment for tax purposes. One 
option is to depreciate at a rate of 30 percent per annum on a declining balance 
basis. The second option is five-year straight-line depreciation of the historical 
acquisition cost. For a single investment, it is profitable to calculate deprecia- 
tion under the first option in years 1 and 2 and to switch to the second option 
in the third and subsequent years. But, for a growing firm with many young 
vintages of capital, it is more profitable to use the 30 percent rule. These gener- 
ous  depreciation  allowances  provide  ample  opportunities  for fast-growing 
firms that are, at the same time, capital intensive in machinery and equipment 
to reduce their tax load. Similar tax-avoidance opportunities are less available 
11. Typically, these ad hoc rules implied that firms were allowed a total depreciation of  more 
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for stagnant firms and for firms that are capital intensive in other dimensions 
such as human capital, structures, financial capital, and intangible capital. 
The claim that the depreciation rules have benefited  fast-growing firms is 
also subject to an important qualification:  because of other impediments to 
growth at the early stages of the life cycle of a firm, newly formed firms may 
find it difficult to exploit tax avoidance provisions. A fast-growing firm benefits 
from certain features of the tax system, but there is no mechanism inducing a 
firm to become fast growing. 
The investment fund (IF) system gained in importance after 1955, and it was 
effective until the end of 1990. The purpose of the system was to induce firms 
to change the timing of investments from booms to recessions. The details of 
the system have varied somewhat over time, but typically a firm was allowed 
each year  to deduct up to 50 percent  of  taxable profits  by  transfering that 
amount to its IF. However, 50 percent (roughly) of the total allocation had to 
be deposited in a non-interest-bearing account at the central bank.I2 The other 
half could be used for any purpose. Thus, as long as the statutory corporate tax 
rate exceeded 50 percent, which it did from 1955 to 1990, it was always profit- 
able to make maximum allocations to the IF system, even if the funds were 
never used for investments. 
In addition, firms were  often granted an additional  10 percent  allowance 
against current profits on funds drawn from their IF for investment purposes. 
For example, a firm with profits of  100 and an allocation of 50 to its IF in year 
t -  1 would be eligible to draw 25 for investment purposes in year t. If it did 
so, it would receive  an additional deduction of 2.5 against profits in year t. 
Investments financed by an IF were considered to be fully written off for tax 
purposes. Since IF financing of investments was also possible for buildings, 
which  enabled  immediate  tax  writeoffs  of  structures  instead  of  the  usual 
twenty-eight-  to  thirty-six-year  straight-line  depreciation,  a tax-minimizing 
firm would use its IF for investments in buildings rather than machinery 
These features of the Swedish corporate tax system had a number of impli- 
cations. The most crucial one is summarized by Bergstrom (1982, 20) as fol- 
lows: “The system has a built-in conservative mechanism giving lower capital 
costs and greater financing possibilities for firms which have, historically, been 
performing well.” But, as shown in the early studies by Little (1962) and Cragg 
and Malkiel(1968), growth in the past is not a good predictor of growth in the 
future. Moreover, the system does not necessarily favor firms with a high level 
or growth rate of total factor productivity. Firms that are stagnating in terms of 
investment  requirements  and  employment  growth  may  nevertheless  have 
higher than average productivity levels or even higher than average productiv- 
ity growth rates. Baily, Haltiwanger, and Hulten (1996), for example, find that, 
12. The release of IF funds on deposit with the central bank required explicit government deci- 
sions. Over time, releases became more and more  frequent. Beginning in the latter half of  the 
1970s,  this change enabled  firms to  use  IFs continuously during a ten-year period  (Sodersten 
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among U.S. manufacturing plants experiencing positive productivity growth 
during the 1980s, a large fraction experienced employment declines. 
Through discretionary releases of funds on deposit with the central bank, 
the IF component of the corporate tax system also encourages firms to make 
investments in recessions, which is probably more attractive for older firms in 
mature industries that face a comparatively predictable future. Firms or sectors 
that,  during  recessions,  confronted  greater  uncertainty  about  the returns  to 
sunk investments were less able to take advantage of  the cyclic investment 
incentives offered by the IF system. 
As a distinct consideration, high statutory tax rates strongly favor debt fi- 
nancing over equity financing of investments. To the extent that debt financing 
is less costly and more readily available for larger, more established firms, high 
statutory tax rates coupled with tax-deductible interest payments work to the 
disadvantage of  smaller firms and potential  entrants.  Debt financing  is also 
more easily available to firms with ready forms of collateral. Hence, firms and 
sectors that more intensively use physical capital reap greater benefits from tax 
code provisions that favor debt financing. In practice,  this aspect of the tax 
system favors the capital intensive manufacturing industries relative to other 
ind~stries.’~  In hindsight, it is not obvious that it was a growth-promoting strat- 
egy to favor manufacturing relative to other industries since manufacturing has 
declined in relative importance in virtually all industrialized countries subse- 
quent to the mid-1960s. 
To  sum up the discussion thus far, several features of the Swedish corporate 
tax system distort the structure of employment and output because their use- 
fulness as tax avoidance mechanisms differs greatly across industries and types 
of firms. On the whole, the tax system favors large, well-established,  capital 
intensive firms.I4 
To provide a sense of  the magnitude  of the distortions  introduced  by the 
Swedish tax system, table 9.4 presents effective marginal tax rates for different 
combinations  of  owners and sources of  finance. Three categories of owners 
and sources of  finance are identified, and the effective marginal  tax rate  is 
calculated assuming a real pretax rate of return of 10 percent. A negative num- 
ber means that the real rate of return is greater after tax than before tax. 
The table highlights several important aspects of the Swedish tax system. 
First, debt financing consistently receives the most favorable tax treatment and 
new share issues the least favorable treatment. Second, the taxation of house- 
holds  as owners is much higher  than for other categories,  and their rate of 
13. Sodersten (1984) shows that, during the 196Os, the effective marginal tax rate on manufac- 
turing was considerably lowered relative to that of other industry and commerce. 
14. The wage earners’ funds instituted in  1984 meant, among other things, the introduction of 
a “profit-sharing tax” (PST) that was operated parallel to the regular corporate tax system. The 
PST rate was 20 percent, but on a base that differed substantially from the regular corporate tax 
base. In effect. this resulted in fairly small overall PST payments. But how the introduction of the 
PST influenced firm behavior and whether it had differential effects on expanding and contracting 
firms or on firms of different sizes are unknown. The PST was abolished in the 1991 tax reform. 368  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
Table 9.4  Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Different Combinations of Owners 
and Sources of Finance, 1960,1970,1980,1985, and 1991 (real pretax 
rate of return 10 percent at actual inflation rates) 
New Share  Retained 
Debt  Issues  Earnings 
1960: 
House  h  o  1  d  s 
Tax-exempt institutions 
Insurance companies 





























































Source: Jan Sodersten. 
Note: All calculations are based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following 
inflation rates were used: 1960: 3 percent;  1970: 7 percent;  1980: 9.4 percent; 1985: 5 percent; 
1991: 5 percent. The calculations conform to the general framework developed by  King and Ful- 
lerton (1984). The average holding period is assumed to be ten years. 
taxation increased during the 1960s and 1970s, whereas the reverse took place 
for insurance companies and tax-exempt institutions. From some point in the 
1960s until the 1991 tax  reform,  more than  100 percent  of  the real rate of 
return was taxed away for a household buying a newly issued share. Third, tax- 
exempt institutions benefit from a large tax advantage relative to the other two 
categories of  owners, and this advantage increased strongly during the  1960s 
and 1970s. It is particularly noteworthy that tax-exempt institutions have a sub- 
stantial  relative  tax  advantage  throughout  when  investing  in  newly  issued 
shares. Fourth, insurance companies are always in an intermediate position in 
terms of tax burden.15 
The calculations for households in table 9.4 are based on an average house- 
15. The figures in table 9.4 show that, in 1980, a real rate of return of 10 percent before tax for 
a tax-exempt institution investing in a debt instrument became 18.3 percent after tax, whereas for 
a household investing in a newly issued share 10 percent before tax became -3.7 percent after tax. 369  Industrial Policy, Employer Size, and Economic Performance 
Table 9.5  The Effective Rate of Corporate Taxation for Firms of Different Size 
and Ownership, 1984-87 
Employment  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Family-owned firms: 
0-19  20  24  27  30 
20-49  16  24  24  27 
50-199  16  20  22  26 
200-  19  14  19  17 
Other firms  14  19  18  21 
Source: Familjeforetagens skatteberedning (1989). 
hold, but for a household owning a successful small or medium-sized firm the 
tax rate was often higher. The main reason was the combined effect of wealth 
and income taxation. Until  1993, the wealth tax was levied on 30 percent of 
the net worth of  a family-owned  company, incorporated  or not. In the mid- 
1980s, the maximum wealth tax rate was 3 percent (for all household wealth 
exceeding SKr 1.8 million). But, since the wealth tax was not deductible at the 
company level, funds required to pay the wealth tax were first hit by the income 
tax and the mandatory payroll tax.Ih 
Gandemo and Lundstrom (1991) provide evidence consistent with the view 
that this feature of the tax system altered business ownership patterns in Swe- 
den. In  their  study  of  manufacturing  firms  with  100-499  employees,  they 
found that “family-owned firms decreased from 38 percent in 1978 to 26 per- 
cent in 1986. Most were acquired by other Swedish firms. Apart from owner 
retirement, firms were sold to secure financial resources for continued develop- 
ment, and because of the high wealth tax in Sweden” (p. 72). Another piece of 
evidence consistent with this view is developed in Norrman and McLure (chap. 
3 in this volume), who show that direct household ownership of publicly listed 
stock went from 75 percent in 1950 to 16  percent in 1992. 
These remarks and the entries in table 9.4 make clear the extraordinary ex- 
tent to which the Swedish tax system favored institutional ownership and dis- 
couraged direct household ownership of firms. The structure of  taxation sum- 
marized in table 9.4 encouraged the strong postwar trend toward an increased 
share of  institutionalized ownership of firms and the increased importance of 
debt financing. The preferential tax treatment of debt over equity and of institu- 
tions over individual ownership benefited larger, publicly traded, and more es- 
tablished firms. 
As direct evidence on this point, table 9.5 reports effective rates of corporate 
taxation for family-owned and other corporations during the period 1984-87. 
16. In practice, the wealth tax was not-or  only to a limited degree-paid  on boats, artwork, 
condominiums, etc. This was a further factor that decreased the relative attractiveness of invest- 
ment in the owner-managed and small business sectors. 370  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
Table 9.6  The Estimated Tax Wedge at 5 percent Real Interest Rate and 1985 
Inflation Rate for Business Capital (percentage points) 
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Source: Fukao and Hanazaki (1987). 
Smaller family-owned firms typically show a higher effective rate of corporate 
taxation than larger firms, and family-owned  firms show a higher rate than 
other firms. 
Major reasons for this result are that other firms had a larger proportion of 
profits in forms that were taxed at reduced rates (capital gains, dividends from 
subsidiaries), and they also had greater opportunities to take advantage of loss 
deductions. Also, large corporations (consisting of many legal entities) are able 
to lower the overall rate of taxation by transferring profits from high-profit to 
low-profit units within the group. This observation implies that a large corpora- 
tion can more easily take initial losses in new activities than an individually 
owned firm (Familjeforetagens skatteberedning 1988, 1989). 
How do these distortions in the Swedish tax system compare to other coun- 
tries? In order partially to address this question, table 9.6 reports corporate tax 
wedges for investments in machinery, buildings, and total business capital (an 
aggregate of machinery and buildings) in several OECD countries as of 1985.17 
According to the table, the tax wedges are invariably negative, which means 
that after-tax rates of return exceed pretax rates of return. Among all listed 
17. The tax wedge equals the difference in percentage points between the before-tax and the 
after-tax real cost of capital. Because of major changes in their corporate tax codes around 1985, 
the table reports wedge values for both old and new tax systems in the United States, Canada, and 
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Table 9.7  Actual Effective Rates for Four Countries in 1980 (at 10 percent real 
pretax rate of return and actual inflation rates) 
United  United 
Kingdom  Sweden  Germany  States 
Households  42.0  105.1  71.2  57.5 
Tax-exempt institutions  -44.6  -51.8  6.3  -21.5 
Insurance companies  -6.7  35.6  48.1  37.2 
Source: King and Fullerton (1984). 
Nore: The figures in the table constitute the averages for each category, given its specific invest- 
ment pattern in the respective countries. 
Table 9.8  The Estimated Tax Wedge at 5 Percent Real Interest Rate and 1985 
Inflation Rate for Housing Investment by a Household in 1985 
(percentage points) 
Borrowing  Asset Drawdown 
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Source: Fukao and Hanazaki (1987). 
countries, Sweden exhibits the largest negative wedges and, hence, the largest 
corporate tax bias toward capital intensive firms and industries. 
For a smaller set of countries, table 9.7 reports effective total tax rates (cap- 
turing both corporate and personal income taxes) by ownership category. Here, 
we see that Sweden was the only country where more than 100 percent of the 
real return was taxed away in  1980 for households making corporate invest- 
ments. This high figure comes about even though it may be presumed  that, 
within  each country, owners choose an  asset distribution  that is reasonably 
optimal relative to the tax system they face. Note that Sweden also exhibits the 
most favorable treatment of tax-exempt institutions. 
While strongly discouraging direct household ownership of businesses, the 
Swedish tax system has generously subsidized investment in the housing stock. 
On this point, table 9.8 reports the estimated tax wedge for housing investment 
in 1985 at a 5 percent real interest rate for eight countries. The table shows that 
housing  investment  received  preferential  tax  treatment  in  all countries,  but 372  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
more so in Sweden. Investment in the housing stock was especially favored in 
the asset drawdown case, in which the housing investment is financed by the 
liquidation of other assets. Given the generous tax subsidies for investment in 
the housing stock and the truly punitive treatment of direct business ownership 
by  households, it is surprising that Swedish households undertake any direct 
business investments. 
Finally, high marginal tax rates on personal income-another  outstanding 
and extreme feature of the pre-1990 Swedish tax system-also  discourage em- 
ployment in  smaller and less capital intensive  firms and thereby  distort the 
industrial  distribution of  output and employment. As  a generalization, eco- 
nomic activities that are highly substitutable between market and home pro- 
duction sectors (cooking, laundering, landscaping, home repairs,  etc.) offer 
greater than average scope for self-employment, employment in small firms, 
start-ups, and family-owned businesses. Thus, in addition to the distortions 
described above, high marginal income tax rates alone work against a vibrant 
entrepreneurial and small-firm sector. 
In summary, we have identified several features of the pre-1990 Swedish tax 
system that strongly disfavored less capital intensive firms, smaller firms, entry 
by new firms, and individual or family ownership of businesses. Many of these 
features are present in other tax systems as well, but international comparisons 
indicate that tax wedges are larger-often  much larger-in  Sweden. The mag- 
nitude of the tax wedges points to the Swedish tax system as a major source of 
distortions in the industrial distribution of employment and in the structure of 
employment within industries. 
9.3  Other Policies and Institutions That Disfavor Younger and 
Smaller Employers 
These features of the tax structure were not the only aspects of the Swedish 
system that disfavored  smaller and younger employers. We  now briefly de- 
scribe four other aspects of  economic policy  and institutional arrangements 
that disfavored smaller, younger, and less capital intensive firms: credit market 
regulation, the mandatory national pension system, employment security laws, 
and a centralized wage-setting institution associated with highly compressed 
relative wages. 
Throughout the postwar period until the late 1980s, the Swedish credit mar- 
ket was highly regulated. Inspired, among other things, by  Gunnar Myrdal’s 
1944  paper on “high taxes and low interest rates,” Swedish credit market policy 
was for a long time aimed at low interest rates for favored sectors of the econ- 
omy. In a situation of full employment, rapid economic growth, and a long- 
lasting boom in construction, the government felt compelled to extend credit 
market regulations in several steps. These developments continued until the 
early  1980s, when a rapid process of deregulation  began. The process was 373  Industrial Policy, Employer Size, and Economic Performance 
Table 9.9  Net Saving as a Percentage of GDP, Annual Averages 1950-92 
1950-59  1960-69  1970-79  1980-92 
Total  11.9  14.7  11.5  4.3 
Household  4.5  3.6  2.1  .9 
Corporate  4.0  2.6  3.0  3.7 
Consolidated government  3.4  8.4  6.4  -  .4 
Source; National accounts. 
completed  in  1989, when  the  remaining  foreign  exchange  controls  were 
lifted.  In 
Lending to the construction and government sectors received priority over 
other sectors until the mid- 1980s. Typically, the government imposed a ceiling 
on lending increases to other sectors by banks and other financial intermediar- 
ies. At the same time, interest rate ceilings were imposed in these other sectors, 
which led to a great deal of  credit rationing. This set of regulations clearly 
favors credit access by larger, older, better-established firms and by capital in- 
tensive firms with ready sources of collateral. Human capital and knowledge, 
on the other hand, are of  less value as collateral. Data presented in Ashgarian 
(1993) regarding the financing structure of different firms give some indication 
that knowledge-  and  human  capital-intensive  firms have  lower debvequity 
ratios. 
The development of Swedish net saving is indicated in table 9.9. Net saving 
rose between the 1950s and the 1960s and thereafter declined sharply. For our 
purposes, the most noteworthy feature is the extremely important role of the 
government sector for net saving in the 1960s and 70s. Close to two-thirds of 
net saving took place there, and a large part of these funds had to be channeled 
to the private sector. But, as long as the government shunned ownership of 
industry, this pattern of national saving presupposed lending on a massive scale 
to the private sector. 
In particular, saving in the social insurance system increased from zero in 
1959 to 4.7 percent of GDP in 1972. This saving took place within the manda- 
tory  national  pension  scheme,  the ATP  (Allman Tillaggs pension)  system, 
which was introduced in 1959.19  It accumulated large surpluses for a long time, 
with the result that in the early  1970s the AP fund system accounted for 35 
percent of the total supply of credit. The AP (Allmanna Pensionsfondend) fund 
lent to industry primarily through intermediate credit institutions. At the end 
of 1976, it accounted for 69 percent of the long-term liabilities of these institu- 
tions (Pontusson 1992). This fund has been (and still is) subject to politically 
18. For an overview of regulations, see Jonung (1993). 
19. Originally, there were actually three funds; later, two more funds that invest in the stock 
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determined rules concerning the composition of its portfolio, and priority has 
been given to the housing sector and the government sector. Generally, only 
one-third or less of the financial assets in the AP fund have been invested out- 
side the government, construction, and real-estate sectors. A very small frac- 
tion of AP-fund lending has been directly to firms.*O 
In  order to channel all the public saving back to the private sector, it was 
logical, and perhaps even necessary, to favor debt over equity financing to a 
great extent. However, it appears that the negative side effects of this policy, 
which have been stressed here, were largely ignored at the time. In any case, 
the national pension system reinforced the distorted pattern of credit allocation 
in the Swedish economy. 
The Swedish Employment  Security Act  (Lagen om Anstallningskydd  or 
LAS) provides employees with extensive protection against unfair dismissal. 
Notably, Sweden is the only country where the order of dismissal is laid down 
in law (Kazamaki Ottersten  1994) and where the probationary period before 
automatic tenure is a mere six months-very  short by  international compari- 
son2’  Furthermore, it seems that, in most countries other than Sweden, unfair 
dismissal regulations are not extended to small firms (Commission of the Euro- 
pean Communities 1993).22 
Under the LAS, the only legal grounds for worker dismissal are gross mis- 
conduct and redundancies. Moreover, the LAS stipulates the “last in, first out” 
principle in case of  dismissals caused by  redundancy. The principle also ap- 
plies to situations where a firm expands employment following an employment 
contraction. A worker laid off because of redundancy is guaranteed to get the 
job back if  the firm fills the position within one year from disrni~sal.~~  This 
principle may be overruled through special agreements between the local labor 
union and the employer. To our knowledge, there is no study quantifying the 
importance of this possibility. In general, there is scant evidence available on 
the application of the last in, first out principle in different countries, but Ras- 
mussen (1993) argues that it is followed more strictly in Sweden than in the 
other Nordic countries. 
20.  For example, in  1980, 7 percent of  total assets constituted direct lending to firms. This 
lending was mainly so-called lending back (Sterlin) based on the rule that employers were allowed 
to borrow up to half the amount they had paid in to the fund during the previous year. The potential 
for using this credit channel was therefore proportional to the wage bill of the firm. This type of 
lending was abolished in  1987. It should also be noted that banks acted as intermediaries and 
determined credit conditions under the lending-back system. Thus, in practice, this type of lending 
constituted cheap refinancing for the banks rather than a direct source of funds for firms. 
21. In many instances, the probationary period has been shortened even further through collec- 
tive agreements, and, in several industries, the trade union can veto temporary employment and 
the use of probationary periods. Storrie (1994) finds that the probationary period is less than six 
months for about one-third of the blue-collar workers in the private sector (the LO-SAF area). 
22. Given how large the employment security issue looms in the public debate, we  were sur- 
prised to learn that no good cross-country survey of collective agreements and legislation and their 
de facto application seems to be available. 
23. There is anecdotal evidence that firms delayed employment expansion in the manufacturing 
sector after the 1992 devaluation in order no1 to be restricted by this rule. 375  Industrial Policy, Employer Size, and Economic Performance 
In a survey study, Age11 and Lundborg (1993) finds that the LAS leads to 
increased recruitment costs and to a lower propensity to expand employment 
in an economic upt~rn.~"  Holmlund (1978) evaluates econometrically whether 
the introduction of  the LAS in  1974 had any effect on hiring frequency. He 
found that hiring frequency was lowered, ceteris paribus, by 5-10  percent as a 
result of the introduction of  the LAS. Holmlund (1986) also found some evi- 
dence of a reduction in new recruitments resulting from an increased wariness 
on the part of firms. 
Several international studies have examined the effect of labor security leg- 
islation on unemployment and employment variations across countries (for a 
survey, see OECD [1993]). The results  are ambiguous,  although  it may  be 
noted that there appears to be a significant positive relation between the labor 
security laws and long-term unemployment. We  also note here that employ- 
ment security legislation is on average stricter in Europe than in North America 
and Japan (Bertola 1990). 
None of these studies shed light on the issue of whether strict employment 
security  provisions  are more  harmful  for smaller  employers.  Nevertheless, 
there are good reasons to think that the LAS imposes greater costs on smaller 
businesses. One reason involves the gains from efficiently matching heteroge- 
neous workers to a variety of tasks and positions. As an employer learns about 
a workers's abilities over time, or as those abilities evolve with the accumula- 
tion of  experience, the optimal assignment of the worker to various tasks is 
likely to change. The scope for task reassignment within the firm is likely to 
rise with firm size. In an unfettered labor market, optimal task reassignment 
often involves mobility between firms, and such mobility is more likely when 
the initial employment  relation involves a  small business. Thus, any  ineffi- 
ciencies induced by the LAS in the assignment of workers to tasks are likely 
to be more severe and more costly for smaller firms. Furthermore, the law of 
large numbers in combination with risk aversion leads to the same conclusion 
and for an obvious reason: one bad recruitment is proportionately more costly 
to bear for a small firm. 
The only direct evidence we know of on this matter is an interview study by 
Kazamaki Ottersten (1994). She found that the LAS is mostly a restriction for 
medium-sized firms. Large firms have typically either found ways to circum- 
vent the rules, or learned to live with them, or made special agreements with 
the trade union that remove the costly effects. In small firms, it is often the 
case that the importance of firm survival is perceived so tangibly by all employ- 
ees and the trade union alike that, at least in times of hardship, it is fairly easy 
to agree on measures that do not strictly adhere to LAS stipulations. Neverthe- 
less, many companies report that the LAS restricts them in detrimental ways, 
24. Kazarnaki (1991, chap. 3) presents theoretical evidence that the introduction of labor secu- 
rity legislation of the LAS type results in stricter quality requirements of applicants and increased 
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leading to increased wariness in recruitment. Such firms cite the rigid order of 
dismissal and the increased cost caused by the employment protection. In addi- 
tion, it has to be emphasized that, if the LAS has impeded the formation of 
new firms and not just the growth of existing firms, this aspect cannot be un- 
covered in an interview study (selection bias). 
Other evidence is also consistent with the view that the employment security 
provisions fall more heavily on smaller firms and some other classes of firms. 
In the United States, both the rate at which workers separate from jobs and the 
rate at which employers destroy job positions decline with the size, age, and 
capital  intensity  of  the  employer  (Brown  and  Medoff  1989; Davis,  Halti- 
wanger, and Schuh 1996). These patterns in worker separation and job destruc- 
tion rates suggest that any costs imposed by a regulation similar to the LAS 
are likely to fall more heavily on younger, smaller, and less capital intensive 
employers and to distort the distribution of employment toward industries char- 
acterized  by  more  stable  establishment-level  employment  and  longer job 
tenures. 
Finally, Swedish labor organizations successfully pursued egalitarian wage 
policies from the  mid-1960s until  the breakdown  of  centralized  wage  bar- 
gaining  in  1983 (Hibbs  1990; Edin  and  Holmlund  1995). The strength of 
Swedish labor organizations and the centralized nature of the wage-setting in- 
stitutions appear  to have facilitated  a remarkable  compression of  the wage 
structure during this period, judging by  cross-country comparisons of  wage 
inequality trends (Davis 1992). To the extent that Swedish wage-setting devel- 
opments drove wages up in the lower tiers of  the distribution relative to out- 
comes under other institutional arrangements, they reinforced the concentra- 
tion of Swedish economic activity in larger, older, and more capital intensive 
employers. This inference follows from the ample evidence that wages rise 
with the age, capital intensity, and-especially-the  size of the employer (e.g., 
Brown and Medoff  1989; and Davis and Haltiwanger 1991). 
Indeed, in the  1950s, the LO economists Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner 
advocated a solidaristic wage policy and centralized wage setting, in part, to 
promote a restructuring of the economy. Rehn and Meidner “knew that efforts 
to raise the pay of  low-wage workers  would  affect employment  outcomes. 
Low-wage industries would be forced to contract, and the workers would have 
to go elsewhere” (Edin and Topel, chap. 4 in this volume). Edin and Topel 
provide evidence that this restructuring occurred after 1960. High-wage indus- 
tries did have greater growth in Sweden than in the United States, absorbing the 
workers who left low-wage industries. The contraction of low-wage industries 
seems to have been  fueled  by  increased relative  wages  in  those industries. 
Hence, there is good reason to believe that the solidaristic wage policy rein- 
forced the concentration of economic activity to large and more capital inten- 
sive firms since these firms, relatively  speaking, benefit from a high average 
wage in combination with a compressed wage distribution. 
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setup during most of the postwar period that, in addition to the tax  system, 
contributed to an excessive concentration  of economic activity in large, old, 
and capital intensive firms. Credit market regulation, the national pension sys- 
tem, employment  security laws, and the successful pursuit of  a compressed 
wage structure all played a role in this regard. 
9.4  Adverse Consequences of Policies That Disfavor Younger and 
Smaller Employers 
The two preceding  sections identify several aspects of the Swedish model 
that  favored  institutional  forms of  business  ownership and  that  disfavored 
younger, smaller, and less capital intensive businesses. This section considers 
whether and how these aspects of the Swedish model impair productivity and 
welfare and retard economic growth. We  do not quantify the various effects 
that we discuss or adduce any hard empirical evidence. Our more modest ambi- 
tion  is simply to advance several points in favor of the proposition  that the 
policies and institutions described in sections 9.2 and 9.3 lower productivity 
and welfare and reduce the potential for economic growth. 
To start with a basic point, certain goods and services are more efficiently 
produced by smaller, owner-operated enterprises. This proposition is difficult 
to deny, for, in looking across countries, we see systematic industry-level pat- 
terns in ownership  and in the size distribution of employment. Restaurants, 
specialty retail outlets, and many personal services tend to be organized into 
smaller, owner-operated firms and production units. In contrast, the manufac- 
ture of  durable goods is typically  organized  into larger  establishments  and 
larger firms with considerable separation of ownership and control. The ubiq- 
uity  of  these  employer  size  and  ownership  patterns  across  countries  with 
widely varying levels of economic development and often quite different regu- 
latory  environments  indicates  that  they  reflect  strong and pervasive  cost- 
saving motives. 
It follows that policies and institutions that penalize direct business owner- 
ship and smaller organizational units carry adverse economic consequences. 
Such policies and institutions harm productivity by distorting business enter- 
prises away from the most efficient organizational forms. They harm consumer 
welfare by raising the cost of goods and services that are most efficiently pro- 
duced by the disfavored organizational forms. And they retard growth by lim- 
iting the economy’s capacity and incentives to respond to changes in the eco- 
nomic environment,  some of  which will call for a redirection  of  resources 
toward disfavored organizational forms. 
What are the cost-saving motives that underlie the efficiency advantages of 
smaller organizational forms in some sectors? Articulating a full and precise 
list of motives is beyond the scope of our discussion, but a few observations 
help convey the larger point. For instance, smallness facilitates concentrated 
ownership. In turn,  concentrated  ownership  mitigates  adverse  selection  and 378  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
moral hazard problems that undermine efficient allocation and utilization  of 
assets. Hence, policies that hamper the organization of economic activity into 
smaller enterprises exacerbate incentive and informational problems, thereby 
undermining productivity  and welfare.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1  988), 
for example, provide empirical evidence that concentrated ownership mitigates 
agency problems. 
Policies that disfavor labor-intensive sectors and techniques of  production 
also cause productivity  and welfare losses. Since certain goods and services 
are more efficiently produced by labor-intensive techniques, policies that dis- 
favor such techniques will harm welfare and productivity  for reasons parallel 
to the ones identified above in the context of business size and ownership pat- 
terns. 
Thus far, our discussion stresses static efficiency and welfare losses induced 
by  policies  that  disfavor  direct  business  ownership,  smaller organizational 
forms, and less capital intensive production techniques, but several observa- 
tions point to potentially large dynamic efficiency and welfare losses as well. 
For example, the successful development of markets for certain new products 
may require a form of flexibility that is best provided by smaller, newer compa- 
nies. The history of the market for personal computers seems to fit this hypoth- 
esis. IBM started with a huge lead in this market but over the course of a few 
years experienced a rapid erosion of market share and profitability. IBM’s dis- 
mal performance in the market for personal computers and workstations seems 
linked to a reluctance to substitute away from its (at one time) hugely profitable 
mainframe computer business. Obviously, new firms that entered the personal 
computer business had no such reluctance to encourage the substitution away 
from mainframe computers. As an example of another, distinct effect, the small 
business sector may provide a low-cost mechanism for identifying and devel- 
oping managerial and entrepreneurial talent. Since fewer assets are at stake, 
managerial blunders or simple ineptitude are less costly when they occur in 
smaller firms. 
Two closely related hypotheses involve ease of entry by new firms rather 
than smallness per se. First, it is seldom obvious ex ante exactly which varia- 
tion of a new technology, a new marketing or distribution tool, or a new organi- 
zational form is most efficient. Consequently,  the most efficient  innovation 
process may entail “planting a thousand seeds” to see which ones develop suc- 
cessfully. When market participation is effectively limited to only a handful of 
large firms, inadequate  variety  and experimentation may occur, slowing the 
growth process. Second, ease of entry facilitates competition; in turn, entrants 
are frequently small, especially in younger, less-mature markets. While econo- 
mists lack convincing formal models of  the phenomenon, many believe that 
competition facilitates innovation and productivity  growth, and entry is often 
an important aspect of competition. 
Returning to the matter of enterprise size, largeness hampers the external 
market for corporate control, especially in economies that lack financial insti- 
tutions and regulatory structures that facilitate corporate takeovers or reorgani- 379  Industrial Policy, Employer Size, and Economic Performance 
zations of poorly performing companies. The market for corporate control is 
one tool for aligning the interests of shareholders and managers and overcom- 
ing agency problems (Jensen  1993). Government policies that undermine the 
market for corporate control, directly or indirectly, are likely to lead to more 
severe agency problems,  especially when other mechanisms for aligning the 
interests of managers and shareholders are absent or relatively ineffe~tive.~~ 
Finally, throughout the OECD economies, recent decades witnessed a shift 
in employment away from goods-producing to service-producing industries. 
Since smaller and less capital intensive businesses play a relatively more im- 
portant role in service-producing industries, the Swedish system impeded this 
transformation and probably slowed the growth of  private sector output and 
employment. 
The preceding discussion only scratches the surface of a broad and compli- 
cated set of issues, but it suggests how various aspects of the Swedish model 
may have reduced productivity  and welfare by  distorting the structure of em- 
ployment and the organization of market activity. Our discussion of potential 
dynamic efficiency  losses associated with  Swedish policies and institutions 
suggests that their adverse consequences may have cumulated over time. Our 
discussion also suggests how the consequences might be more severe in peri- 
ods that require intensive restructuring of the economy. 
9.5  Evidence of Distortions in the Swedish Industrial Distribution 
of Employment 
We now relate U.S.-Swedish differences in the industrial distribution of em- 
ployment to measures of employer size, capital intensity, the wage level, and 
other industry characteristics. Our interpretation of the evidence rests on the 
premise that the U.S. industrial distribution reflects a much more neutral set of 
economic policies and institutions. For this reason, we take the U.S. industrial 
distribution as a benchmark against which to evaluate the extent of distortions 
in the Swedish distribution. 
Of course, not all US.-Swedish differences in the industrial distribution of 
employment arise from the distortionary policies and institutions that we high- 
light. Natural comparative advantage undoubtedly plays an important role as 
well (see Learner and Lundborg, chap. 10 in this volume). But the U.S. indus- 
trial distribution can serve as a suitable benchmark for identifying and quanti- 
fying systematic distortions in the Swedish distribution, even though factor 
endowments and other determinants  of  the industrial distribution differ be- 
tween  the  two countries. The key  issue is whether omitted determinants of 
US.-Swedish differences  are correlated  with the  variables  we consider.  To 
gauge whether an omitted variables problem underlies our regression results, 
25. Perhaps because of compressed compensation structures and high marginal tax rates, direct 
forms of incentive pay may be relatively ineffective in Sweden in aligning the interests of manag- 
ers and shareholders. Hence, government policies that favor the organization of economic activity 
into large firms might create more severe agency problems in Sweden than in other countries. 380  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
we consider the effect of omitting from our regressions certain  industries in 
which Sweden or the United States plausibly has a pronounced comparative 
advantage. We also group our data in such a way as to minimize the effect of 
U.S.-Swedish  differences in the extractive  industries (mining, forestry, fish- 
ing), where natural comparative advantage is likely to play the largest role. 
Table 9.10 highlights U.S.-Swedish  differences by  listing industries with 
large absolute values of the log of the ratio of industry share of U.S. employ- 
ment to industry share of Swedish employment. The listed industries are or- 
dered by ascending values of this ratio, as reported in the rightmost column. 
Inspection of the table yields four impressions: 
1. Relative to the United States, Swedish employment is concentrated in 
basic manufacturing industries that are typically dominated by larger firms and 
production units. 
2. Sweden exhibits a much larger share of employment in health, education, 
and social services. In large part, this difference reflects public provision of 
and other subsidies for child care, elderly care, and related social services in 
Sweden. 
3. Except for items in the health, education, and social services category, 
the United States has a larger employment share in most service sectors. 
4.  The industries with relatively large U.S. employment shares appear to be 
drawn disproportionately from the extremes of  the human  capital and wage 
distributions: (i) personal and household services, retail trade, textiles and ap- 
parel, and restaurants and hotels rely heavily on low-skill labor and pay rela- 
tively low wages (at least in the United States); (ii) business services, instru- 
ments, aircraft and missiles, and financial institutions rely heavily on high-skill 
labor and pay relatively high wages. 
This last pattern  fits nicely  with the  view  that  Sweden has  a more com- 
pressed  skill distribution and more compressed  skill prices than most other 
OECD countries, especially the United States. More generally, the impression- 
istic evidence garnered from table 9.10 points to distortions in the  Swedish 
industrial distribution along the lines predicted by our characterization of tax 
policy and other aspects of the Swedish system. 
We turn now to a more detailed investigation of  US.-Swedish differences 
in the industrial distribution of employment. Two considerations prompt us to 
consider the manufacturing  and nonmanufacturing  sectors separately in our 
investigation.  First,  industry-level data  are available  in  more  disaggregated 
form for the manufacturing  sector. Second, we have at our disposal a much 
richer set of covariates for manufacturing industries. 
With one exception, we carry out our analysis at the most disaggregated 
level allowed by our data, bearing in mind the requirement to match U.S. and 
Swedish industries and to construct industry-level covariates for the regression 
analysis. The exception involves the extractive industries. Employment shares 
in these industries are largely determined by natural resource endowments and 
are probably not closely related to the factors emphasized in our earlier discus- Table 9.10  Differences in the Industrial Distribution of Employment, Sweden' 
and the United States:  Selected Industries 
% of Employment 
Sweden 
United States,  Log Ratio: 





Wood and paper products 
Ships and rail equip. 
Machinery and equip. 
Health, education, social services, 
Food and drink 
Transportation and public utilities 
Construction 
Personal and household services' 




Textiles and apparel 
Instruments 
Aircraft and missiles 
Restaurants and hotels 



























































-  .85 
-  .79 
-.71 
-  .63 
-.55 
-  .44 
-.34 
-.33 










aThe Swedish employment data are tabulated by Statistics Sweden and cover all economic sectors. 
bThe  U.S. industry-level data are from the 1988 County Business Patterns data (nonmanufacturing) 
and the  1987 Longitudinal Research Data Base (manufacturing). Together, these two data sets 
cover the population of taxpaying private business establishments with one or more paid employ- 
ees, excluding agricultural production, railroad, and household employment. We  supplemented 
these private sector data with 1988 BLS Establishment Survey data on public sector employment 
in hospitals, education, transportation, public utilities, and the postal service. The industry-level 
U.S. data exclude self-employed individuals, but employment shares are calculated as the ratio of 
industry employment to total civilian employment including the self-employed. 
cThe  log of the industry's US. employment share minus the log of the industry's Swedish employ- 
ment share. The industries are ordered by ascending values of this quantity in the table. 
dIndustrial  classifications are based on our concordance between the 1987 US. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system and the Swedish Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (SNI). The document on the Swedish SNI is dated 1985. 
'The  U.S. data do not include all public sector social service employees and, hence, understate the 
relative U.S. employment share in this category. 
'Because the U.S. data do not include domestic household workers and the self-employed, they 
substantially understate the relative U.S. employment share in this category. 382  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
sion. For this reason, we lump all extractive industries into a single industry 
group. It turns out that the US.-Swedish employment share ratio is close to one 
for this industry group, even though it differs greatly from one for particular 
extractive industries. 
We begin with the connection between employer size and the industrial dis- 
tribution of employment. For fourteen broad nonmanufacturing industries and 
two broad manufacturing industries (durables and nondurables), we computed 
the establishment coworker mean-that  is, the number of  employees  at the 
average worker’s place of employment.26 
Figure 9.6 illustrates the 1987 empirical relation between the Swedish estab- 
lishment coworker mean and U.S.-Swedish  differences in the industrial distri- 
bution of  empl~yment.~~  The figure conveys a clear message: relative to the 
United States, the Swedish industrial distribution of employment is tilted away 
from industries with relatively high fractions of employment in smaller estab- 
lishments. This pattern holds for the sample of sixteen major industry groups, 
and it holds even more strongly in a fourteen-industry sample that excludes the 
manufacture of durables and nondurables. 
Table 9.11 reports several bivariate regressions that relate U.S.-Swedish dif- 
ferences  in  the  industrial  distribution  of  nonmanufacturing  employment  to 
simple summary measures of  the distribution of employees by employer size. 
Column 2 reports regression results corresponding to the dashed line in figure 
9.6. Rather remarkably, the Swedish establishment coworker mean  accounts 
for 47 percent of the variation  in U.S.-Swedish  differences in the industrial 
distribution of nonmanufacturing employment. The point estimate implies that 
the Swedish employment share is sixty-eight log points lower than the U.S. 
share for an industry group with a value of the coworker mean two standard 
deviations below its mean value. 
The goodness of fit for the nonmanufacturing regression is unaffected when 
we replace the Swedish establishment coworker mean with the corresponding 
U.S.  measure.  In  contrast, the Swedish firm coworker mean  has  much less 
explanatory power.28  The inferior performance of the firm-based measure prob- 
ably arises for several reasons: conceptual ambiguities in defining the scope of 
26. The coworker mean equals the size-weighted mean of employer size; it is the first moment 
of the distribution of employees by employer size. Tables 9.14 and 9.15 below provide summary 
statistics for various measures of the coworker mean. 
27. The log ratios plotted in fig. 9.7 below are constructed from Swedish data for 1987 and U.S. 
data for  1987 and 1988. The Swedish establishment coworker statistics plotted in fig. 9.6 are 
constructed from 1984 data, and the Swedish firm size statistics used below are constructed from 
1987 data. The U.S.  size distribution summary statistics draw on data for 1985 and 1987. For 
the U.S. manufacturing sector, the firm and establishment size distribution summary statistics are 
computed  directly  from the establishment-level and  firm-level data described in  Davis, Halti- 
wanger, and Schuh (1996). In all other cases, the size distribution summary statistics are estimated 
from data on the number of employees and establishments by employer size class using the algo- 
rithm described in Davis (1990). 
28. The available data do not enable us to construct a measure of the US.  firm coworker mean 
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Fig. 9.6  Log(emp1oyment share ratio) vs. Swedish establishment coworker mean, sample of sixteen major industry groups 
Note: The solid line shows the size-weighted regression line for the sixteen-industry sample, slope = -.I02  (.046),  R'  = ,263.  The dashed line shows the 
size-weighted regression line for fourteen nonmanufacturing industries, slope = -.471  (.132),  R2 = ,514. The log ratio equals  100 times the log of  the 
ratio of industry share of  U.S.  employment to industry share of Swedish employment. 384  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
Table 9.11  US.-Swedish Industry Employment Share' Ratio Regressions: 
Summary Statisticsb  and Regressions' for Nonmanufacturing 
Industries 
j  x  100, 
U.S. industry employment share 
Swedish industry employment share 
dependent variable: log 
mean = 3.07,  SD = 12.76 
Regression Slope Coefficients (SE) 
Mean (SD) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Swedish establishment  199.2  -.471  -.267 
Swedish firm  710.6  -.011 
U.S. establishment coworker  460.0  -.118  -.067 
coworker mean  (72.3)  (.132)  (.199) 
coworker mean  (542.2)  (.029) 
mean  (327.4)  (.033)  (.050) 
Adjusted R2  .473  -.072  ,473  SO6 
"here  are fourteen industry-level observations for each variable 
bAll  summary statistics are computed as employment-weighted quantities. 
'All  regressions include a constant and are weighted by  the U.S.-Swedish average value of the 
industry employment share. 
dThe Swedish firm coworker mean and the U.S. establishment coworker mean are computed from 
private sector data only. The Swedish establishment coworker mean is computed from data that 
cover the public and private sectors. 
a firm, practical difficulties in measuring firm  size, and the exclusion of a large 
fraction of public sector employees in Sweden (relative to the United States) 
when measuring the firm size distribution. 
While figure 9.6 and  table 9.11 indicate that Swedish employment is tilted 
toward industries dominated by larger establishments, we found no evidence 
that Swedish employment is more concentrated in large establishments than 
U.S. employment. On the contrary, the U.S. establishment coworker mean ex- 
ceeds twice the corresponding Swedish value, even though U.S. employment 
is more heavily concentrated  in industries dominated by  smaller production 
units. Perhaps this difference reflects smaller product market size in Sweden, 
but the same pattern holds in the manufacturing sector, which is presumably 
dominated by tradable goods. The difference may reflect different criteria in 
the two countries for defining the scope of an establishment, but we can offer 
no evidence on this score. In any case, the difficulty of interpreting compari- 
sons of size distribution measures between  countries argues in favor of  the 
industry-based focus of our analysis. 
We constructed a more disaggregated matched industry-level data set and a 
richer set of covariates for the manufacturing sector. The disaggregated manu- 
facturing data also show higher shares of  Swedish employment in industries 385  Industrial Policy, Employer Size, and Economic Performance 
dominated by larger employers, but the effect is weaker and less consistent 
than in the nonmanufacturing  sector. Figure 9.7 shows a scatterplot of the log 
employment share ratio against the Swedish establishment coworker 
Table 9.12 reports bivariate regressions of the log employment share ratio 
on several alternative summary measures of the employer size distribution. Un- 
like for the nonmanufacturing  sector, the results show little relation between 
the log employment share ratio and summary measures of the U.S. size distri- 
bution. For the full sample of manufacturing industries, the U.S. establishment 
coworker mean actually shows a positive relation to the log employment share 
ratio, contrary to the implications of our thesis. This anomalous result disap- 
pears when  we exclude the aircraft and missiles industry, a major outlier in 
terms of both US.-based measures of employer size and the log employment 
share ratio.30 
Table as a whole, we interpret the results in figure 9.7 and table 9.12 as 
supportive of the hypothesis that Sweden’s distribution of employment is tilted 
toward industries with larger employers, as compared to the United States.” 
Our results for the nonmanufacturing sector in figure 9.6 and table 9.11 above 
strongly support this hypothesis. Thus, if one accepts our premise that the U.S. 
industrial distribution reflects a comparatively neutral set of policies and insti- 
tutions, the evidence pushes one to the view that Swedish policies and institu- 
tions distorted employment  and productive activity away from industries  in 
which smaller businesses play a greater role. Although not speaking directly 
to the matter, the evidence also suggests that Swedish policies and institutions 
have distorted employment and productive activity away from smaller busi- 
nesses within industries. 
Table 9.12 also reports  regressions  of  the log employment  share ratio on 
industry-level  measures  of  capital  intensity,  energy  intensity,  productivity 
growth, exposure to international trade, average production worker wages, and 
job reallocation intensity.32  Figures 9.8 and 9.9 plot the log employment share 
ratio against the capital intensity and hourly wage measures, respectively. 
29. The coworker log equals the size-weighted mean of log employer size. It equals the expecta- 
tion of log employer size taken with respect to the distribution of workers by employer size. 
30. The US.  aircraft and missiles industry is dominated by  large firms and plants that engage 
in much large-scale production for the U.S. military. There is no comparable source of demand 
for military aircraft and missile products in Sweden. In this respect, the aircraft and missiles indus- 
try is a special case, and we often report separate results for samples that exclude this industry. 
Our regression results are typically similar, but stronger and better fitting, when we exclude the 
aircraft and missiles industry. 
31. This conclusion is not much affected if we exclude the six manufacturing industries in the 
wood and paper products sector from the regressions in table 9.12. 
32. The import penetration ratio in table 9.12 equals the value of imports divided by  imports 
plus domestic shipments. The export share equals the value of exports as a fraction of total domes- 
tic production. Excess job reallocation measures the extent of simultaneous plant-level job creation 
and destruction within an industry. It is measured as gross plant-level job creation plus gross job 
destruction minus the absolute value of the net industry employment change, all expressed as a 
percentage of industry employment. The wage and factor intensity variables that appear in table 386  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
These bivariate  regressions  and scatterplots for the manufacturing  sector 
identify the following additional patterns of U.S.-Swedish  differences in the 
industrial distribution of employment: 
1. Sweden exhibits relatively high employment shares in capital intensive 
and energy-intensive industries. The point estimate in table 9.12 above implies 
that the Swedish employment share is sixty-six log points higher in an industry 
with a log capital per worker value two standard deviations above its mean. 
2.  Sweden exhibits relatively low employment shares in manufacturing in- 
dustries that experienced rapid total factor productivity growth over the period 
1973-88. The opposite effect holds with respect to labor productivity growth. 
For both productivity growth measures, the statistical relation is weak, and the 
point estimates imply small effects. These results provide no support for the 
view  that  Swedish  industrial policy  directed  resources to high-productivity 
growth industries. 
3. There is also weak evidence that Sweden’s distribution of employment is 
tilted away from manufacturing industries that exhibit higher rates of excess 
job reallocation. This finding fits with the view that LAS employment security 
provisions  penalize  sectors  characterized  by  less-stable  establishment-level 
employment. The effects are moderate in size but imprecisely estimated. The 
point estimate implies that the Swedish employment share is thirty-two log 
points lower in an industry with an excess job reallocation rate two standard 
deviations above the mean. 
4.  Trade exposure, as measured by either U.S. import or export intensity, is 
unrelated to US.-Swedish differences in the distribution of employment. 
5.  Sweden exhibits higher employment shares in high-wage industries. The 
effects  are fairly large and tightly  estimated.  For an industry with a mean 
hourly wage two standard deviations above the overall U.S. mean (4.92 in 1982 
dollars),  the  point  estimate  implies  that  the  Swedish employment  share  is 
seventy-two log points greater. 
Statistically and quantitatively significant effects of capital intensity, energy 
intensity, employer size, and wages carry over to multivariate regression speci- 
fications  as well  (see table 9.13).  The multivariate  regression  results  differ 
from the bivariate results in two main respects. First, the sign of the coefficient 
on the capital intensity variable  switches. That is, once we condition on the 
other regressors  in table 9.13, Sweden’s employment distribution is actually 
tilted away from capital intensive manufacturing 
Second, the coefficient on the Swedish establishment coworker mean also 
switches sign. In this regard, note that the estimated effects on the Swedish 
9.12 are averages of  1987 and  1988 industry-level values. The other variables are averages of 
annual industry-level values over the period 1973-88.  Data on wages, factor intensity, productivity 
growth, and  international trade are constructed from the NBER  data files described in Abowd 
(1991). Job reallocation data are from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). 
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Table 9.12  US.-Swedish Industry Employment Share Ratio Regressions: Summary 
Statistics"  and Bivariate Regressionsb  for Manufacturing Industries 
dependent variable: log  j  x  100 
US. indurtry employment share 
Swedish industry employment share 
-__~_  ~~ 
Regr.  Sample 
Regressor'  Mean  SD  Coeff.  SE  Sized  Adj. R' 
Swed. est. coworker meane 
Swed. est. coworker log 
Swed. est. coworker log' 
Swed. firm coworker mean 
Swed. firm coworker log 
Swed. firm coworker logc 
US.  est. coworker mean 
U.S. est. coworker meane 
U.S. firm coworker meane 
US.  log(capital/worker) 
U.S.  log(energy/worker) 
U.S. excess realloc. rate 
U.S. labor prod. growth 
US. TFP growth rate 
U.S. export share 
U.S. import penetr. ratio 
US.  PW hourly wage 



















781.7  -  ,029 
1.064  -41.7 
1.041  -26.5 
1,255.5  -  ,025 
1.33  -  16.9 
1.32  -22.4 
2,452.6  ,0087 
1,122.5  -  .004 
4 1,223  -  .00029 
.7  1  -46.8 
,864  -33.8 
.03  539.2 
.011  -1,492 
.009 1  2,078 
.077  12.7 
,054  -67.4 
2.63  -11.15 
2.46  -14.57 


















66  ,094 
67  ,046 
66  ,165 
66  .21 
67  .094 
66  .19 
67  .05 
66  -.012 
66  ,029 
65  .23 
65  ,196 
65  ,048 
65  .057 
65  ,063 
65  -.016 
65  -.013 
65  .18 
64  ,338 
Note: PW = production worker. 
'All summary statistics are computed as employment-weighted quantities. 
bAll regressions include a constant and are weighted by  the US.-Swedish average value of the industry 
employment share. 
'The  Swedish firm coworker mean and the US.  establishment and firm coworker means are computed 
from private sector data only. The Swedish establishment mean is computed from data that covers the 
private and public sectors. 
dThe sample size varies because of  missing observations on some variables. 
'Excludes the aircraft and missiles industry. 
firm and establishment coworker means are the same magnitude. Note, also 
from table 9.12, that the mean and  standard deviation  are roughly  twice as 
large for the  firm coworker mean  as for the establishment  coworker  mean. 
Thus, the multivariate  specifications also indicate that, on net, the Swedish 
distribution of employment is tilted away from industries in which smaller em- 
ployers play a greater role. 
Our multivariate regression analysis also reveals an interesting nonlinearity 
in the relation between the industry wage structure and US.-Swedish differ- 
ences in the industrial distribution of employment. In particular, if we think in 
terms of low-wage, medium-wage, and high-wage industries, Sweden's distri- 
bution of manufacturing employment is sharply distorted away from low-wage 
industries and toward higher-wage and, especially, medium-wage industries. 
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Table 9.13  US-Swedish Industry Employment Share Ratio Regressions: Multivariate 
Regressions for Manufacturing Industries 
) x  100 
U.S. industry employment share 
Swedish industry employment share 
dependent variable: log 
Regressor 
US.  establishment coworker mean 
U.S. firm coworker mean 
Swedish establishment coworker 




U.S. excess reallocation rate 
US.  production worker hourly wage 
US.  absolute deviation from mean 




Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)"  (5)  (6)" 
.0105 
(.0083) 












,0354  ,0368 
(.0145)  .0141 
-  ,0323  -.0398 
(.0091)  (.0094) 
53.14  70.08 
(22.49)  (23.15) 
-34.66  -45.53 
(12.72)  (13.31) 
-646.8  -506.2 
(312.6)  (309.7) 
-22.55  -22.21 
(5.21)  (5.05) 
9.94 
(4.58) 
64  64 
,451  ,484 
,0442 
(.0161) 






















-  403 
(320.4) 










-  ,0443 















Note: See also nn. b and c in table 9.12 above. 
aIncludes the aircraft and missiles industry. The other regressions reported in this table exclude aircraft 
and missiles. 
bThis variable equals the absolute deviation from the employment-weighted mean hourly wage for pro- 
duction workers in the U.S. manufacturing sector. It has a weighted mean value of 2.118 and a weighted 
standard deviation of  1.563. 
try  1 pays a mean wage five dollars (about two standard deviations) below the 
overall mean manufacturing wage, industry 2 pays a mean wage equal to the 
overall mean, and industry 3 pays a mean wage five dollars above the overall 
mean. Then, the estimated wage effects in column 3 of table 9.12 imply that 
the US.-Swedish employment share ratio is 161 log points higher in industry 
1 than in industry 2 (conditional on the other regressors). But the implied em- 
ployment share ratio is only sixty-one log points higher in industry 2 than in 
industry 3. These are enormous effects, and the nonlinearity is a sharp one. 
Thus, the regression results confirm that the Swedish distribution of  employ- 392  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
ment  is tilted toward  higher-wage  industries, but  this  tilt  primarily reflects 
small employment shares in low-wage industries and only secondarily reflects 
large employment  shares in high-wage  industries.  For complementary  evi- 
dence that Sweden’s centralized wage-setting  system tilted employment away 
from low-wage industries, see Edin and Tope1 (chap. 4 in this volume). 
We examined the sensitivity of the regression results in tables 9.12 and 9.13 
to the exclusion of the six manufacturing industries in the wood and paper 
products sector. Leamer and Lundborg (chap. 10 in this volume), for example, 
argue that relatively high Swedish employment shares in these industries re- 
flect natural comparative  advantage. Our results are not greatly  affected by 
excluding these industries, except for results that pertain to the factor intensity 
measures. In both the bivariate and the multivariate specifications, the effects 
of the capital intensity and energy intensity  variables  are greatly attenuated 
when we exclude these industries. In many specifications, the factor intensity 
variables are statistically insignificant. The overall goodness of fit of the regres- 
sions deteriorates somewhat when we exclude the six industries. For the multi- 
variate specifications in table 9.13, the adjusted R2  values decline by 7-12  per- 
centage points. 
Finally, we investigated whether the industrial distribution of Swedish em- 
ployment became more or less distorted (relative to the U.S. distribution) be- 
tween  1984 and 1992. (see fig. 9.10). While changes in the Swedish distribu- 
tion  occurred  over  this  period,  they  were  unrelated  to  the  US.-Swedish 
differences and (in unreported results) to any of the regressors in tables 9.12 
and 9.13. 
In summary, we uncovered  systematic and quantitatively  important U.S.- 
Swedish differences in the industrial distribution of employment. For the most 
part, the pattern  of  these differences fits well with the distortions we antici- 
pated from our characterization of Swedish economic policies and institutions. 
In particular, Sweden’s industrial distribution  of  employment is tilted sharply 
away  from lower-wage  industries and industries in which smaller employers 
play a greater role. In terms of a bivariate relation, Sweden’s employment distri- 
bution  is also sharply  tilted away from less capital intensive manufacturing 
industries. The connection between capital intensity and U.S.-Swedish differ- 
ences in the industrial distribution of employment reverses, however, when we 
condition on other variables that we considered. 
On balance, we conclude that tax policy, credit policy, employment security 
provisions,  and  Sweden’s system  of  centralized  wage  bargaining  probably 
caused large distortions in the industrial distribution of Swedish employment. 
It stands to reason that these aspects of the Swedish system also seriously dis- 
torted the structure of employment within industries, although the limitations 
of our data preclude a direct assessment of this hypothesis. While we are not 
in a position to evaluate the overall productivity, employment, growth, and wel- 
fare consequences of  these distortions, we think that our analysis lends cre- 0.004 
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dence to the proposition that the consequences were large and adverse. Further 
study of the costs of  Swedish industrial policy seems highly warranted. 
9.6  International Trends in Employment Structure 
This section recounts three trends in the structure of employment common 
to many or all OECD countries in recent years. We mention these trends be- 
cause they suggest the operation of exogenous economic forces that are likely 
to have amplified the costs of the distortions in the structure of Swedish em- 
ployment induced by Swedish policies and institutions. 
We have already remarked on the most important and widespread trend: the 
large,  ongoing  shift  in  employment  from  goods-producing  to  service- 
producing industries. This trend cuts sharply against those sectors of the econ- 
omy that have traditionally been dominated by larger firms, larger production 
units, and more capital intensive production processes. 
A second trend, less pronounced and consistent, is the movement away from 
employment  in  larger  production  units  within  industries.  Loveman  and 
Sengenberger (1991) examine changes in the distribution of  employment by 
establishment  and firm size in the  six largest OECD countries. Only in the 
manufacturing  sector are the available data adequate for drawing a clear pic- 
ture. The data indicate that the secular trend away from employment in smaller 
manufacturing plants reversed or at least ended by the 1970s or 1980s in the 
countries under study. 
Regarding a third and related trend, more open to measurement and interpre- 
tation problems,  Loveman  and Sengenberger also report evidence  of  a ten- 
dency toward employment in smaller firms in manufacturing and in the econ- 
omy as a whole for the largest OECD economies. 
These pieces of evidence suggest that the aspects of the Swedish system that 
disfavored smaller firms and establishments and less capital intensive produc- 
tion processes cut against some important changes in the economic environ- 
ment that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, and aside from 
any  endogenous  dynamics  in the evolution of  the Swedish  welfare state, it 
seems likely that the distortions induced by the Swedish model worsened over 
the course of the past two decades. 
9.7  Concluding Remarks 
This paper builds a plausible case for the thesis that Swedish economic poli- 
cies and institutions  seriously distorted  the distribution  of  employment  and 
output between and within industries and-as  a consequence-reduced  pro- 
ductivity, welfare, and economic progress. 
If one accepts this thesis, then several recent economic policy reforms offer 
some grounds for optimism that Sweden will gravitate toward a less-distorted, 395  Industrial Policy, Employer Size, and Economic Performance 
more-efficient structure of employment with favorable consequences for pro- 
ductivity and growth. 
The sharp reduction from 55 to 30 percent in statutory rates of corporate 
taxation mitigates several of the tax-induced distortions identified in section 
9.2. On this point, OECD (1991) shows that estimated corporate tax wedges 
in Sweden became comparable in size to those in many other OECD countries 
after the 1991 tax reform. Termination of the investment fund system in 1991 
removed another aspect of the tax system that favored established firms over 
entrants. Reductions in top marginal income tax rates facing individuals dimin- 
ish the incentive to substitute socially inefficient forms of home production for 
goods and services that are more efficiently produced in the market sector. The 
introduction of a flat 30 percent rate of taxation on individual capital income 
greatly diminishes the harsh treatment of direct investment in businesses that 
prevailed  under the old tax  system. Moreover, since the late 1980s, Swedish 
credit markets have been substantially deregulated, eliminating another policy 
instrument that disfavored younger,  smaller, and less capital intensive firms. 
And, finally, the demise of centralized wage bargaining  has been  associated 
with an uncompression of relative wages that, over time, is likely to contribute 
to a less-distorted distribution of employment between and within industries, 
“The leveling of the playing field” for different types of owners and sources 
of finance was not complete following the 1991 tax reform (table 9.4 above). 
Further measures were taken in 1993-94,  notably the abolishment of taxation 
of dividends at both the corporate and the investor level and the lowering of 
capital gains taxation to 12.5 percent. These measures strongly increased the 
relative attractiveness of direct household ownership of businesses, and they 
reduced the relative cost of equity financing. However, effective from 1995, 
these measures have to a large extent been undone through the reintroduction 
of double taxation of dividends and a doubling of the tax rate on capital gains. 
These changes reverse the previous movement toward a more neutral treatment 
of debt versus equity as sources of finance. The most recent changes also bene- 
fit foreign investors at the expense of  domestic investors. In particular,  it is 
noteworthy that the marginal effective tax rates for households buying a newly 
issued share almost doubled between  1994 and 1995 (McLure and Norman, 
chap. 3 in this volume). 
Thus, despite several favorable developments in the early 1990s, economic 
policy choices continue to generate incentives that seriously distort the struc- 
ture of Swedish employment and business ownership. To a certain extent, tax- 
induced distortions in employment patterns are inevitable in an economy with 
such a large public sector. But, even given the size of the Swedish public sector, 
there is ample room for improving the design of the tax system in terms of the 
aspects discussed in this paper. 396  Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson 
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